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Future generations of NASA and U.S. Air Force vehicles will require lighter mass while being 
subjected to higher loads and more extreme service conditions over longer time periods than the 
present generation.  Current approaches for certification, fleet management and sustainment are 
largely based on statistical distributions of material properties, heuristic design philosophies, 
physical testing and assumed similitude between testing and operational conditions and will likely be 
unable to address these extreme requirements.  To address the shortcomings of conventional 
approaches, a fundamental paradigm shift is needed.  This paradigm shift, the Digital Twin, 
integrates ultra-high fidelity simulation with the vehicle’s on-board integrated vehicle health 
management system, maintenance history and all available historical and fleet data to mirror the life 





Existing methodologies for vehicle certification, fleet management and sustainment are largely 
based on similitude and a heuristic understanding of the effects of operational and anomalous 
conditions on the structural health, safety and performance of a vehicle.  A common 
manifestation of similitude and heuristics is in the form of the “factors-of-safety” used during 
design and certification.  So-called factors-of-safety are rooted in a heuristic legacy wherein a 
factor of, say, 1.5 or 2.0 has “always” been sufficient to account for a particular class of 
unknown unknowns (e.g., loads, material properties).  Often, the history and pedigree of such 
factors is uncertain. 
 
Additionally, compounding of factors-of-safety is pervasive and may lead to unnecessarily heavy 
structures and reduced performance without necessarily improving the actual safety of the 
vehicle or the probability of mission success.  Even current probabilistic or reliability 
methodologies are inadequate because they are based on assumed similitude between the 
circumstances in which the underlying statistics were obtained and the environment in which the 
vehicle operates.  When similitude is violated, probabilistic methods break down as readily as 
those based on factors-of-safety.  Although statistical assessments are important, they must be 
part of an overall best-physics approach that is relevant to each individual vehicle. 
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Similitude is so commonplace in the current engineering process that it is often invisible to the 
engineers who invoke it.  A ubiquitous example can be found in engineering design and analysis 
where computer codes (including commercial finite element codes) are used to “predict” failures.  
Such codes are of limited “predictive” capability because, in a general sense, they only produce 
responses that have previously been observed experimentally and then programmed for future 
assessment.  For example, to account for a phenomenon such as the interaction between 
environment and structural damage, the issue must have been foreseen, specific experiments 
must have been performed and their results must have been incorporated within the models.  
Further, since different environments, or even different degrees of environment, have differing 
synergies with damage, the specific environments that will be encountered by the vehicle must 
have been considered during the design process.  Otherwise, “worst case” scenarios must be used 
to ensure the health and safety of the vehicle; albeit at the expense of weight and performance. 
 
Another common manifestation of similitude and heuristics is in the form of inspection intervals 
and schedules used for fleet management and sustainment.  Inspection schedules are typically 
determined from experience with similar vehicles that have performed similar missions.  Often, 
inspection is performed based on experience with the fleet leader, the vehicle in the fleet that 
experienced the most flights or the worst degradation.  If, for example, unacceptable degradation 
of a component was found during an inspection of the fleet leader, it may be decided that all 
vehicles of that class be inspected immediately regardless of the specific history of each vehicle.   
 
These issues are amplified when new designs or operating conditions are considered.  Unlike the 
methods used to insure safety and reliability of existing vehicles that have a clear and well-
understood legacy, many future vehicles will have little direct precedent to follow, and in some 
cases (e.g., long duration space missions) the vehicle may be impossible to inspect and maintain 
in the conventional sense.  Thus, the ability to fully understand degradation and anomalous 
events and foresee previously unknown unknowns may represent the difference between mission 
success and mission failure. 
 
The Digital Twin* paradigm is a long-term vision aimed at addressing these and other 
shortcomings of current practices for certification, fleet management and sustainment.  This 
paper focuses on a discussion of the requirements for, development of and application of the 
Digital Twin.  The paper is composed of the following sections: conventional approaches for 
certification and sustainment; the concept of a Digital Twin and its applications, including 
certification and sustainment, vehicle health and mission management, and in-situ forensics; 
identification of near-term opportunities for implementing elements of the Digital Twin 
paradigm; a brief discussion of the advantages of the Digital Twin; its potential influence on 





Much of the philosophy and many of the guidelines used for certification, fleet management and 
sustainment of NASA and U.S. Air Force vehicles can be found in government and professional 
society standards and handbooks.  A small sampling of requirements for structures, materials and 
non-destructive evaluation (NDE) is shown in Table 1.  These documents include expansive 
*Originally conceived by the  
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discussions of structural design and test, including factors-of-safety; fracture control; materials 
and processing; NDE; effects of specific environments; detailed analysis of failure modes; and 
standards for numerical models and analysis.  Many of the documents used by NASA and the 
U.S. Air Force are developed in-house, while others are derived from technical societies such as 
the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) and the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME).  These documents are rooted in decades-old experience with 
laboratory tests, protoflight tests and flight histories.  In this section, some of the conventional 
approaches to certification, fleet management and sustainment will be illustrated through the 
discussion of examples taken from several of the documents, including: NASA-STD-5001A, 
NASA-STD-5019 and NASA-HDBK-5010. 
 
The criteria for determination of factors-of-safety for both deterministic and probabilistic 
analyses are discussed in several of the standards listed in Table 1, including NASA-STD-
5001A1 that specifically addresses spaceflight hardware.	   	   As discussed in the standard, the 
accepted practice for “verification” of launch vehicles is “the prototype approach in which a 
separate, dedicated test structure, identical to the flight structure, is tested to demonstrate that the 
design meets the factor-of-safety requirements.”  An alternative to the prototype approach is “the 
protoflight approach wherein the flight structure is tested to levels somewhat above limit stress 
(or load) but below yield strength.”  The latter approach requires a factor-of-safety for yield that 
is higher than the factor-of-safety used for prototype testing.  “No test” options are also allowed 
for metallic structures; however, according to the standard “projects which propose to use the 
‘no-test’ approach generally must use larger factors of safety.”  In all of these cases, 
“verification” depends on the ability to perform laboratory tests on a “dedicated test structure 
[that is] identical to the flight structure.”  Additionally, the loading, boundary conditions, 
environment must also be representative of flight conditions. 
	  
Table 1: Sample of Publicly Available Standards and Handbooks 
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The minimum design and test factors-of-safety for metallic and composite structures outlined in 
NASA-STD-5001A1 are given in Tables 2 and 3.  These factors vary widely depending on 
circumstance and can be as large as 2.0 depending on the material and local structural 
configuration.  Because of the apparent scatter in material response under cyclic and creep 
loading, the corresponding factors are even larger.  According to NASA-STD-5001A1, a service 
life factor of 4.0 is applied to “spaceflight structures made of well-characterized materials and 
with sufficient load cycle data that accounts for all in-service environments,” while for  
“structures made of materials that are not well characterized or those that may have complex 
failure modes, such as composite structures, an additional factor and testing may be required by 
the assigned Technical Authority at the responsible NASA Center.” 
 
Fracture critical hardware requires the additional imposition of damage tolerance requirements 
(see, for example, NASA-STD-50192).  Here, specific requirements, exceptions and 
methodologies for assessing metallic and composite pressure vessels, rotating machinery, 
structural components and other fracture critical hardware are discussed.  The application of 
continuum fracture mechanics analyses, including NASGRO fatigue crack growth analysis (see 
JSC 22267B6), is the foundation of much of the codified fracture control methodology.   
 
An extreme case of codified conservatism is discussed in NASA-HDBK-501010, where separate 
conservatisms for crack size, applied loads, material properties, and analysis are discussed for 
	  
Table 2: Minimum Design and Test Factors for Metallic Structures1 
	  
Table 3: Minimum Design and Test Factors for Composite/Bonded Structures1 	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“known cracks” in fracture critical hardware.  Known cracks in fracture critical hardware require 
special treatment wherein upper bounds for crack size estimate accounting for “any possible non-
detected adjacent cracks and/or crack tip extensions” are required, as shown in Figure 1.  Here, 
the crack size assumed for analysis (2cA) is a combination of the NDE-detected crack dimensions 
(2cD) and an adjustment based on the NDE detection capability (2cN).  
Additionally, worst-case limit loads for the mission must be used to compute the far field stress 
state at the location of the detected crack.  Typically, these loads are used in conjunction with an 
assumed fatigue spectrum.  As an example, one of the many loading spectra developed by NASA 
Goddard Space Flight Center for the analysis of payloads during launch and landing of the Space 
Shuttle (STS) is shown in Table 4.  The table shows the number of cycles during launch and 
landing and the percentage of the total limit stress to be applied during each of these cycles.  




Table	  4:	  Launch	  and	  Landing	  Spectrum	  for	  STS	  Payloads10	  	  
	  
Figure 1: Imposed Conservatism for Detected Cracks (Adapted from Reference 10).	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The handbook requires analysts to use material properties corresponding to the lower bound of 
fracture toughness and the upper bound of fatigue crack growth rate (da/dN vs. ΔK) as shown in 
Figure 2.  Upper bounds of fatigue crack growth rate curves are either visually estimated or 
statistically estimated as being three standard deviations above the mean values.  Finally, 
analyses of known flaws must show that the component has a service life factor of four and a 
safety factor of 1.5 against fracture.  
 
 
The codified practices that are advocated and mandated by these many standards and handbooks 
have been carefully developed over several decades and have certainly stood the test of time.  
They are invaluable tools for use by the present-day engineer for assessment of vehicle structure.  
However, they tend to be reactive rather than proactive and are often based on heuristic 
experience, worst-case scenarios and fleet leaders rather than on the specific material, structural 
configuration and usage of an individual vehicle.  Moreover, they may not be sufficient to 
address the future extreme requirements of some future NASA and U.S. Air Force vehicles.  
 
 
The Digital Twin 
 
Concept 
Future generations of aerospace vehicles will require lighter mass while being subjected to 
higher loads and more extreme service conditions over longer time periods than the present 
generation of vehicles.  As a result, demands on structural materials will be greatly increased and 
structural margins will necessarily be decreased.  Since extreme thermal, mechanical, and 
acoustical loadings may be impossible to reproduce in a laboratory at anything more than the 
component scale, the identification and quantification of limit states via computational 
simulation is needed.   
	  
Figure 2: Crack Growth Rate for Detected Cracks10 
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Because the vehicles are likely to encounter conditions that cannot be foreseen, revolutionary 
approaches to verification and validation of the models, simulations and systems must also be 
developed.  Additionally, the ability to modify and evaluate the consequences of modification to 
mission parameters in near-real time will be required.  Moreover, the consequences of failure 
during a long-duration space mission, where the vehicle is far from home, will almost certainly 
be catastrophic. 
 
Future generations of vehicles will rely on increasingly complex, heterogeneous and 
multifunctional material forms with increasingly complex failure modes.  Thus, the extensive 
legacy of historical flight information incorporated in the various standards and handbooks that 
were based on decades of aircraft and spacecraft design experience, will likely be insufficient to 
either certify future extreme vehicles or to guarantee mission success.  Additionally, the 
extensive physical testing that provided the confidence needed to assure the success of previous 
missions has become increasingly expensive to perform.  Thus, a complete and fundamental 
understanding of physical processes related to degradation at the material, structural and system 
level and throughout the vehicle’s life-cycle is needed to move beyond the past decades of 
empirical and heuristic design rules that result in inefficiencies and unquantifiable reliability.   
 
Complex missions, particularly those where external support is difficult or impossible, will 
necessitate complete real-time management of complex materials, structures and systems that 
will ultimately lead to “self-aware” vehicles.  The numerous resulting engineering challenges 
will necessitate a shift from current empirical-based standard engineering practice to an 
additional emphasis on cradle-to-grave sustainment and reliability that will include (1) new 
multidisciplinary physics-based methods to ensure robust certification, and (2) new 
multidisciplinary methodolgies to ensure life-cycle sustainability.  If various best-physics (i.e., 
the most accurate, physically realistic and robust) models can be integrated with one another and 
with on-board sensor suites, they will form a basis for certification of vehicles by simulation and 
for real-time, continuous, health management of those vehicles during their missions.  They will 
form the foundation of a Digital Twin15-18. 
 
A Digital Twin is an integrated multiphysics, multiscale, probabilistic simulation of an as-built 
vehicle or system that uses the best available physical models, sensor updates, fleet history, etc., 
to mirror the life of its corresponding flying twin.  The Digital Twin is ultra-realistic and may 
consider one or more important and interdependent vehicle systems, including airframe, 
propulsion and energy storage, life support, avionics, thermal protection, etc.  The extreme 
requirements of the Digital Twin motivate the integration of design of materials and 
revolutionary approaches for material processing.  Manufacturing anomalies that may affect the 
vehicle are also explicitly considered, evaluated and monitored.  In addition to the backbone of 
high-fidelity physical models of the as-built structure, the Digital Twin integrates sensor data 
from the vehicle’s on-board integrated vehicle health management (IVHM) system, maintenance 
history and all available historical and fleet data obtained using data mining and text mining.   
 
By combining all of this information, the Digital Twin continuously forecasts the health of the 
vehicle or system, the remaining useful life and the probability of mission success.  The Digital 
Twin can also predict system response to safety critical events and uncover previously unknown 
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issues before they become critical by comparing predicted and actual responses.  Finally, the 
systems on board the Digital Twin are capable of mitigating damage or degradation by activating 
self-healing mechanisms or by recommending changes in mission profile to decrease loadings 
thereby increasing both the life span and the probability of mission success. 
 
Attributes 
A graphical representation of some of the attributes of a Digital Twin is shown in Figure 3.  The 
narrative of the figure proceeds by column from the left-top pane to the right-bottom pane, as 
follows:   
 
Left Top Pane  
The Digital Twin incorporates precise models of the as-built configuration of a vehicle or component, 
including material microstructure, defects, fabrication anomalies, etc.  Determination of these parameters 
requires characterization at multiple length scales in the range from less than a micron to meters.  Once this 
precise “baseline” is determined, the ultra-high fidelity physical models can be used to predict future states 
of the vehicle. The montage illustrates the wide range of material types, physical length scales and 
structural configurations that may be considered by the Digital Twin.  From upper left to lower right are: 
failed fibers in a fiber-reinforced composite material, a finite element model of a space vehicle, a specimen 
undergoing arc-jet testing, the BSTRA (ball strut tie rod assembly) joint in the Space Shuttle Orbiter main 
	  
Figure 3: Graphical Representation of the Digital Twin Paradigm. 	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engine feedline flowliner, the microstructure of an advanced alloy containing a fatigue crack, a carbon 
nanotube and a friction stir-welded aluminum skin-stiffened panel. 
 
Left Middle Pane 
The Digital Twin relies heavily on its on-board IVHM system to continuously monitor aerodynamic, 
thermal, inertial and other loading in addition to measures of degradation in vehicle health and 
performance.  The montage illustrates representative IVHM systems and system outputs.  From left to right 
are: a measured strain field near a fatigue crack, a cyclic loading spectrum, an IVHM fiber optic strain 
sensing system and a computer tomography image of delaminations (blue squares) in a laminated 
composite material. 
 
Left Bottom Pane 
The backbone of the Digital Twin is a suite of ultra-high fidelity physical models of the vehicle and its 
systems and structures of interest.  These may include models of one or more important and interdependent 
vehicle systems, including airframe, propulsion and energy storage, life support, avionics, thermal 
protection, etc.  The montage illustrates the wide range of physical phenomena, models and modeling 
outputs that may be included in the Digital Twin.  From upper left to lower right are: an illustration of an 
atom modeled in a quantum mechanics or molecular dynamics simulation, a three-dimensional finite 
element simulation of deformation and fracture in an aluminum alloy, a hypothetical computational fluid 
dynamics simulation of a vehicle during atmospheric re-entry, prediction of the number of cycles needed to 
nucleate a fatigue crack (Nnuc), a finite element simulation of mode shapes in the Space Shuttle Orbiter 
main engine feedline flowliner, a multi-scale model of crack growth, and a simple model of radiation 
transport through boron-nitride nanotubes as a neutron shielding material. 
 
Center Top Pane 
The Digital Twin uses its on-board IVHM system to update the physics-based models with sensor data and 
produce continuously refined predictions of vehicle health and probability of mission success.  It can also 
perform option and impact investigation to answer questions regarding the impact of changes to mission 
profile on all future conditions of the vehicle.  The figure shows Bayesian updates of the probability of 
failure as a function of time wherein sensor data is incorporated to increase accuracy and decrease 
uncertainty in the predictions. 
 
Center Pane 
Each Digital Twin is uniquely developed for a particular vehicle and may be employed to “fly” future 
missions during the design and certification process, continuously assess health during flight, perform in-
situ forensics of the effect of potential or real hazards and virtually evaluate the effect of potential changes 
to the mission.  A hypothetical vehicle is shown in the figure. 
 
Center Bottom Pane 
The Digital Twin integrates fleet data, maintenance reports and other historical information via data mining 
and text mining to further inform simulations of the vehicle.  The figure shows a notional representation of 
the computational and data processing capabilities of the Digital Twin as represented by the PLEIADES 
supercomputer at NASA Ames Research Center, a model of the human brain and streams of text and data 
supporting the Digital Twin. 
 
Right Top Pane 
The Digital Twin is enabling to virtual digital certification and sustainment by replacing past decades of 
empirically based design rules that result in structural inefficiencies and unquantifiable reliability with 
ultra-high fidelity simulations, sensor systems and data that are immediately relevant to each unique 
vehicle.  The figure shows several of the many existing standards and handbooks that may be replaced by 
the Digital Twin. 
 
Right Middle Pane 
The Digital Twin mirrors the actual flight of the flying twin by using sensor updates to continuously assess 
vehicle health including determining remaining life of structural components and systems, estimating 
probability of mission success and evaluating in-situ repair (self-healing), in-flight mitigation or load 
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alleviation strategies and other mission modifications.  The effects of modifications of mission parameters 
are evaluated and previously unforeseen consequences are evaluated.  The figure shows estimates of 
remaining useful life (RUL) as a function of the number of load cycles. 
 
Right Bottom Pane 
The Digital Twin also uses its assessment of historical norms, fabrication/manufacturing reports and 
maintenance data (where available) combined with Bayesian updates to high-fidelity models to perform in-
situ forensics, including anomaly detection/diagnosis and fault tree analysis.  The figure shows a schematic 
of a fault tree associated with the hypothetical failure of a sensor. 
 
 
Identification of Near-Term Opportunities 
 
Many of the technologies critical for the Digital Twin are currently being developed under 
related visions for multi-scale and multi-physics modeling, structural health management, high-
performance computing and others.  Unlike those individual visions, the vision for the Digital 
Twin integrates the broad range of technologies with a singular focus.  However, such an 
ambitious concept is unlikely to attain maturity for many decades, so a series of intermediate 
steps is required.  Among these steps is the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Digital 
Twin: Spiral 117, a plan to integrate existing state-of-the-art technologies, benchmark current 
capabilities and identify gaps using components from an existing U.S. Air Force vehicle, 
specifically, the F-15, as a testbed.  Another approach, being considered by NASA, is to focus on 
a small highly critical non-redundant component such as a microelectromechanical system 
(MEMS) that has characteristic length scales accessible with only the highest fidelity simulation 
methods and health management tools available.  By exercising such ultra-high fidelity 
approaches on flight hardware, the shortcomings of the existing state-of-the-art in multiscale 
modeling, in-situ experimentation and material state awareness will be highlighted.  
 
 
Advantages Over Conventional Approaches 
 
As a virtual instantiation of a flying vehicle, the Digital Twin is expected to be able to experience 
every event that its flying twin experiences.  Because of its ability to mirror the life of a specific 
vehicle in an as-built state, the Digital Twin will necessarily revolutionize certification, fleet 
management and sustainment.  It will also decrease system weight by reducing reliance on 
statistical distributions of material properties, heuristic design philosophies, physical testing and 
assumed similitude between testing and operational conditions.  Once the vehicle is launched, 
the Digital Twin will increase the reliability of the flying vehicle because of its ability to 
continuously monitor and mitigate degradation and anomalous events.  Additionally, it will 
enable mission managers to make knowledgeable decisions regarding the consequences of 
possible in-flight changes to a vehicle’s mission.  
 
 
Influence on National Goals 
 
Although the Digital Twin represents a revolution in the paradigms used for certification, fleet 
management and sustainment in support of extreme flight missions, it has the ability to influence 
other National priorities and goals.  In addition to its prominence in the recently-published 
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roadmaps of NASA’s Office of Chief Technologist (OCT)15-16 and plans of the Air Force 
Research Laboratory17-18, the Digital Twin paradigm can provide focus to the recent advocacy of 
the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Research Council (NRC) in the areas of 
Simulation Based Engineering Science (SBES)19, Integrated Computational Materials 
Engineering (ICME)20 and Materials State Awareness21.   
 
Many of the concepts discussed in the NSF’s recommendations for SBES are pervasive 
throughout the themes of the Digital Twin, including, multiscale modeling of materials, dynamic 
simulation of sensors, and verification and validation.  Because the vehicles needed for future 
extreme missions are unlikely to be developed using existing material forms, the design and 
development of new enabling (e.g., multifunctional, nanostructured, ultra-durable) materials is 
required and is well aligned with the NRC’s ICME roadmap.  Additionally, an understanding of 
the exact state of the structure of the vehicle or its systems, including the existence of defects at 
the microstructural and, possibly, the atomistic scale, is required as a baseline for ultra-high 
fidelity simulations.  The ability to assess the evolution of defects is a critical element within the 
Digital Twin’s on-board IVHM system and is well aligned with the NRC’s advocacy for 
developments in Materials State Awareness. 
 
Figure 4 is taken from the executive summary of the NASA OCT roadmap for technology area 
12 (TA 12)16 and proposes a broad spectrum of future NASA technologies that can be focused by 
the Digital Twin.  The headings in the ellipses within Figure 4 represent the numbers and titles of 
various sections in the OCT TA 12 roadmap where the technologies are discussed.  
 
Potential spin-offs from the development of the Digital Twin span the breadth of the Nation’s 
industrial and manufacturing sectors, infrastructure and development of nanotechnology.  By 
replacing conventional engineering practices with an understanding of the degradation of an 
individual vehicle or vehicle system, the paradigm of the Digital Twin will impact the way that 
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Future generations of aerospace vehicles will require lighter mass while being subjected to 
higher loads and more extreme service conditions over longer time periods than the present 
generation of vehicles.  As a result, demands on structural materials will be greatly increased and 
structural margins will necessarily be decreased.  Additionally, the requirements placed on other 
systems and subsystems will be greater than those previously experienced even though demands 
for long-term reliability will increase.  Because extreme thermal, mechanical, and acoustical 
loadings may be impossible to reproduce in a laboratory at anything more than the component 
scale, the identification and quantification of limit states via computational simulation is needed.  
Additionally, the vehicles are likely to encounter conditions that cannot be foreseen.  Thus, the 
ability to modify and evaluate the modification of mission parameters in near-real time will be 
required. 
 
Current approaches to certification, fleet management and sustainment of NASA and U.S. Air 
Force vehicles are largely based on statistical distributions of material properties, heuristic 
design philosophies, physical testing and assumed similitude between testing and operational 
conditions and will likely be unable to address future extreme requirements.  Some of the current 
approaches to certification, fleet management and sustainment were illustrated through the 
	  
Figure 4: Integration of Technologies within a Digital Twin16 
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discussion of examples taken from several documents, including: NASA-STD-5001A, NASA-
STD-5019 and NASA-HDBK-5010. 
 
To address the shortcomings of conventional approaches, the paradigm of a Digital Twin was 
presented.  The Digital Twin is an integrated multiphysics, multiscale, probabilistic simulation of 
an as-built vehicle or system that uses the best available physical models, sensor updates, fleet 
history, etc., to mirror the life of its corresponding flying twin.  The Digital Twin is ultra-realistic 
and may consider one or more important and interdependent vehicle systems.  The Digital Twin 
integrates sensor data from the vehicle’s on-board IVHM system, maintenance history and all 
available historical and fleet data.  By combining this information, the Digital Twin continuously 
forecasts the health of the vehicle or system, the remaining useful life and the probability of 
mission success.  The systems on board the Digital Twin are also capable of mitigating damage 
or degradation by activating self-healing mechanisms or by recommending changes in mission 
profile to decrease loadings thereby increasing both the life span and the probability of mission 
success. 
 
Near-term opportunities for early development of the Digital Twin paradigm at AFRL and 
NASA were discussed and include the integration of various existing state-of-the-art 
technologies, benchmarking of current capabilities and identification of gaps using critical flight 
components as testbeds.  Advantages of the Digital Twin, its potential influence on far reaching 
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